If there is no actual, verifiable harm to the Child-just CPS/GAL hearsay or sayso-they have no standing & the court has no jurisdiction. You tell n make sure Your Child knows to NEVER subject to any line of questions of their family or You as parents-tell n teach Your Child the phrase-I want my Lawyer/Parents-lawyer is Constitutionaly enforced demand that all question CEASE immediatly-later when Your Child is older, teach them of how dirty the system can be & to ask, "is this a custodial interogation"??? See Edwards v Az, a custodial interogation demands the ass't of a lawyer & teach them the importance of the right of the 5th Amend-the right to be silent. Always challenge jurisdiction on actual, provable harm-if Your childs simply remains silent in defense of Your family-GAL/CPS has nothing to twist, distrot & fanricate a case out of. Any1 needing HELP can write petesfarms@yahoo.com but my time is limited, as well as my funds. If You have done wrong-donut come to me n expect me to help You weasil Your way out of harm done to a child Link to the Case Preview: http://supreme.justia.com/us/405/645/ Link to the Full Text of Case: http://supreme.justia.com/us/405/645/case.html Stanley re-inforces Your right to full Due Process Protections, family courts donut meet the requirements of the 6th Amend & are therefore a void porcess-a fraud, a system of statutory creation-no statute trumps the 6th Amend per the Supremecy Clause 1 Refuse to enter any family court proceeding for lack of jurisdiction 2 Demand a lawyer n state a lawwyer You can trust 3 Demand a probable cause hearing & strike all hearsay by GAL?CPS as inadmissable-remind the judge of His Oath, any violation of the Oath he is no longer acting in any judicial capacity/authority-any orders the judges signs after he has lost jurisdiction of violated the Oath is subject to 18 USC 1001 with 42 USC 1985 Use Direct link to 42 U.S.C. 1988 this to give You authority to act to enforce violations of Title 18- see18 usc 242, title 18 usc 241, 18 usc 241 242 Also is the judge refuses to grant a full blown probable cause hearing, the judge has procedurally defaulted & lost jurisdiction, object to everything GAL/CPS states as they r not a witness with 1st Hand knowledge. If they start out with, "I was told"-OBJECT, Heasray or "I blieve what I saw"-OBJECT as what they believe is immaterial, The Child said-OBJECT, was the parent/lawyer present & a Child is not a legally competant witness & CPS/GALs know how to coach false testimony & any LIES-OBJECT & ask for the witness to be held in contempt with perjury charges filed-if the judge refuses-demand he recuse-then remove the action to federal court & name the judge as a defendant-You want to make a stick-name the County Commissioners, chier presiding judge, GAL/CPS & all superiors, scretary of state & Governer Last but not least-NEVER allow a CPS/GAL to enter any of Your private property-even with a cop, they still need a warrant issued by a neutal & detached judge-if this is a judge You have removed, the warrent is VOID Here is some case desions I found in my research; "Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it .... No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it."-- American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 16, Section 177 (emphasis added)
[A] natural parent may only be deprived of custody of a child upon a showing substantial harm to the child." In re Askew (Tenn. Supreme Court 1999)
The child has a similar liberty interest in being in the care and custody of her parents. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2000); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 427 Mass. 1201, 691 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1998). This liberty interest is protected both by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, which constrains governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, and by the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, which guarantees "fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
“There must be some other special factor such as harm to the child or custodial unfitness that justifies state interference.” (Ark. S.Ct. Linder v. Linder)
For parents contempting a grandparent visitation order and choosing jail to protect their children and who want to turn their child over to someone other than the grandparent:
One of Suboh's rights as a mother was the right to choose a proxy custodian for Sofia following her arrest. See In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 383 Mass. 573, 421 N.E.2d 28, 34 (1981) (noting, in case of incarcerated mother, that mother's "presumptive right to custody of the child includ[es] the right to choose a caretaker proxy").
Vt. GLIDDEN v. CONLEY: "That a child might benefit from contact with a grandparent or that a parent might deny grandparent visitation for no good reason in the court's view are not the kind of compelling circumstances contemplated by the Constitution or this decision. Rather, to overcome a parent's decision on grandparent visitation, a grandparent must show circumstances like parental unfitness, see Linder, 72 S.W.3d at 858 (some special factor like unfitness of custodial parent must exist to justify state interference in parent's right to decide grandparent visitation issue); Stacy, 99-CA-00579-SCT, 23, 798 So.2d at 1280 (compelling circumstances suggesting something close to unfitness of custodial parent may be sufficient to justify visitation award to grandparents over parent's objection), or significant harm to the child will result in the absence of a visitation order (thus suggesting parental unfitness), see Linder, 72 S.W.3d at 858 (harm to the child in absence of visitation order may warrant overriding parent's visitation decision); Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060 (to rebut presumption in custodial parent's favor, grandparent must prove that failure to grant visitation will "cause the child significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety, or welfare"). This construction of the statute minimizes the risk that a court [or legislature - added] will substitute its judgment for that of the parent simply because the court [or legislature - added] disagrees with the parent's decision. Our construction of the statute also recognizes that a dispute between a fit custodial parent and the child's grandparent over grandparent visitation "is not a contest between equals." Stacy, 99-CA-00579-SCT, 23, 798 So.2d at 1280; see also Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 7-8 (finding unconstitutional a statute that places parent on equal footing with third parties seeking visitation with the child)."
As Alabama found true in Beck v. Beck: Ordering scheduled visitation in a case where the grandparents have never been denied visitation with the child, where there is no indication in the record that the father would deprive his child of a relationship with the grandparents, where the grandmother described her relationship with the child as "normal grandparent involvement," and where the grandparents' time with child has decreased in large part because of the child's and the parent's schedules, goes beyond the constitutionally mandated limits for awarding grandparent visitation.
Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in the rearing of their children is basic in our society, and the legislature could properly conclude that those primarily responsible for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” GINSBERG v. NEW YORK 390 US 629 (1968)
In footnote 1 in Seagrave v. Price (Ark. S.Ct.) “We note that our holding finds nearly all of the Act unconstitutional, save one clause wherein grandparents may petition for visitation when no parent has custody. See § 9-13-103(c)(2).”
Arkansas Supreme Court in Linder v. Linder: “We begin our analysis of the instant case by concluding that Lea Ann, as a single parent, has a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment in prohibiting state intrusion on her parenting of Brandon.” Linder v. Linder Arkansas court of Appeals: “We further acknowledged that, following a divorce, children belong to a different family unit than they did when their parents lived together. The new family unit consists of the children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous to the unit's members as a whole, to each of its members individually, and to the way they relate to each other and function together is in the best interests of the children.” [Parker v. Parker, No. CA00-331 (Ark.App. 09/19/2001)] IL Supreme Court “…one parent's well-established fundamental right’ to raise her child without interference from the state is not diminished by the death of the other parent.” {Schweigert v. Schweigert, (Ill. 2d 2002)} “Additionally, the United States Supreme Court does not limit the fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of children to decisions made by joint parents…” {Wickham v. Byrne/Langman v. Langman, IL Supreme Court}
“We, therefore, reject any argument that single parents are entitled to less constitutional liberty in decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” {Wickham v. Byrne/Langman v. Langman, IL Supreme Court} “Parents have the constitutionally protected latitude to raise their children as they decide, even if these decisions are perceived by some to be for arbitrary or wrong reasons. The presumption that parents act in their children's best interest prevents the court from second guessing parents' visitation decisions. Moreover, a fit parent's constitutionally protected liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her children mandates that parents-not judges-should be the ones to decide with whom their children will and will not associate.”
Brooks et al v. Parkerson (Georgia)----While there are, to be sure, many instances where the grandparent-grandchild bond is beneficial to the child, we have found, and the parties cite, little evidence that this is most often the case. It has also been noted that even if such a bond exists and would benefit the child if maintained, the impact of a lawsuit to enforce maintenance of the bond over the parents' objection can only have a deleterious effect on the child. Bohl, supra at 296. Note, Columbia Law Rev. at 124. In so saying, we recognize that there are many grandparents who have a deep and significant bond with their grandchildren, and that we have an explicit policy in this state to "encourage that a minor child has continuing contact with parents and grandparents." OCGA § 19-9-3(d).
Even though Justice Hannah dissented in Linder for various reasons, his statement persuasively shows that grandparent visitation should not be the same as parental visitation. “The trial court granted the paternal grandfather the same visitation as a noncustodial parent. Unless this visitation was granted in the context of a custody proceeding, it appears to be granted in error. Even then, absent a finding of an extremely close paternal type relationship, which was absent in the facts of this case, this amount of visitation could not have been in the best interests of this child. I would reverse and remand this case for the trial court to reconsider the paternal grandfather's visitation.” (Linder v. Linder)
In the Interest of A.M.K. a Child: Colorado appellate opinions have confirmed that "natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children." In re Petition of J.D.K., 37 P.3d 541, 543 (Colo.App. 2001); see L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271 (Colo. 2000). This fundamental liberty interest gives rise to a presumption that the best interests of the child will be furthered by a fit natural parent. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).
As Justice O'Connor noted in Troxel, grandparental visitation has no historic roots in the common law but rather is a legislated creature of the late twentieth century. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 96-97 (plurality opinion); see also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 770 n.2 (Ga. 1995) ("At common law grandparents had no legal right of visitation with their grandchildren over the objections of the parents."); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
Arkansas Supreme Court, Linder v. Linder: “The question then becomes whether unfitness solely to decide visitation matters is a compelling interest on the part of the State that warrants intrusion on a parent's fundamental parenting right and overcomes the presumption in the parent's favor. We conclude that it is not. So long as Lea Ann is fit to care for Brandon on a day-to-day basis, the Fourteenth Amendment right attaches, and the State may not interfere without a compelling interest to do so. As Justice O'Connor wrote in Troxel, the State must accord "special weight" to the mother's decision so long as she is a fit mother. See Troxel at 68-69.” In re Custody of Nunn, 103 Wash. App. 871, 14 P.3d 175 (2000). In Nunn, the appellate court considered a paternal aunt's argument that the mere fact that the natural mother of the child was rejecting contact with the paternal relatives made her unfit. The court framed the issue as follows: And so the question boils down to this: Can an otherwise fit parent be found unfit because she chooses to fight a nonparental custody petition, because she openly expresses her dislike of the side of the family that brought the custody petition, because she avoids old family friends who are supporting the other side in the custody litigation,because she doesn't trust the custody evaluators who have been brought into the litigation, and because she doesn't foster a good relationship between her child and all of those people? The answer is no. Nunn, 103 Wash. App. at 887-88, 14 P.3d at 184. The court went on to say: "It would be an anomaly to consider an otherwise fit parent unfit simply for exercising her fundamental right as a parent to limit visitation of her children with third persons-even if, as in Smith, those third persons are….family members and close friends of family." Id. at 888, 14 P.3d at 184. Linder: See Dodge v. Graville, 121 S. Ct. 2584 (2001) (memorandum decision). In Dodge, the [US Supreme] Court summarily vacated a decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, which had limited a parent's right to cut off all grandparental visitation and cited Troxel as authority for doing so. While this court can only speculate on the Court's reasons for vacating the Arizona Court of Appeal's decision in Dodge, it is apparent that, in the Court's view, cutting off some or all parental visitation, in and of itself, was not the critical point on which the Troxel decision turned. Vermont: Glidden v. Conley quoting Linder:
That a child might benefit from contact with a grandparent or that a parent might deny grandparent visitation for no good reason in the court's view are not the kind of compelling circumstances contemplated by the Constitution or this decision. Rather, to overcome a parent's decision on grandparent visitation, a grandparent must show circumstances like parental unfitness, see Linder, 72 S.W.3d at 858 (some special factor like unfitness of custodial parent must exist to justify state interference in parent's right to decide grandparent visitation issue); Stacy, 99-CA-00579-SCT, 23, 798 So.2d at 1280 (compelling circumstances suggesting something close to unfitness of custodial parent may be sufficient to justify visitation award to grandparents over parent's objection), or significant harm to the child will result in the absence of a visitation order (thus suggesting parental unfitness), see Linder, 72 S.W.3d at 858 (harm to the child in absence of visitation order may warrant overriding parent's visitation decision); Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060 (to rebut presumption in custodial parent's favor, grandparent must prove that failure to grant visitation will "cause the child significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety, or welfare"). This construction of the statute minimizes the risk that a court will substitute its judgment for that of the parent simply because the court disagrees with the parent's decision. Our construction of the statute also recognizes that a dispute between a fit custodial parent and the child's grandparent over grandparent visitation "is not a contest between equals." Stacy, 99-CA-00579-SCT, 23, 798 So.2d at 1280; see also Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 7-8 (finding unconstitutional a statute that places parent on equal footing with third parties seeking visitation with the child). |
You need to be a member of Command Center to add comments!
Comments